“Specsmanship”: Missing the Point of a “Complete Product”

The Definition of “Specsmanship”

Wikipedia defines Specsmanship as the inappropriate use of specifications or measurement results to establish the putative superiority of one entity over another, generally when no such superiority exists. It is commonly found in high fidelity audio equipment, automobiles and other apparatus where uneducated users identify some numerical value upon which to base their pride or derision, whether or not it is relevant to the actual use of the device. Smartphones and the early microprocessor market are also examples.

Two Specsmanship Case Studies

Most recently, we are seeing specsmanship in the smartphone market.  As the smartphone market has matured into 7th, 8th, 9th generations of smartphones, the differentiation among products has been reduced to smaller and smaller differences in the products : resolution of the camera, display size or alleged brightness, etc.. In earlier generations, Apple, and the Android phone manufacturers created a highly effective intangible market need to possess their latest generation phone in which features were less important. I called this market need the smartphone “Star Wars” phenomenon causing people to line up around the block as if to see the latest Star Wars film.  Most market analysts now agree that the smartphone market frenzy has run its course. Apple’s strategy to reinvigorate the market by creating a higher price point product has predictably fallen flat. Apple’s move surprised me because the marketers at Apple seemed to miss the consumer market sentiment. Water resistance in my view was the last major device feature with a market need to protect phones from the dreaded “toilet drop.” Samsung introduced water resistance in the 5th generation Galaxy, and permanently in the Galaxy 7. I have not been motivated to buy a new phone since the Galaxy 7.

In another, more dramatic and pivotal example, my first personal experience of the specsmanship phenomenon was at Intel, during the original first generation microprocessor war: the Intel 8086 versus the Motorola 68000. Without diving too deeply into the technical specifications, the Intel 8086 on its face was technically inferior to the Motorola 68000 at a critical time when microprocessors were very new, customers had doubts, and the market was just beginning to establish a foothold in electronics design. Facing this marketing challenge, Intel’s Vice President of Marketing at that time, Bill Davidow, made a momentous decision to “differentiate” Intel and the 8086 not its specifications, but on Intel’s long-term vision for its microprocessor family of products and to focus its marketing efforts on senior management executives of its customers, not the engineers.  Davidow famously delivered a presentation to the Intel sales force, “How To Sell A Dog.” The message was to ignore the spec and concentrate on the customers higher level needs, and the security of an investment in Intel with its long-term vision to provide them with greater value and competitive advantage.

Motorola fatefully decided to concentrate its marketing strategy entirely on the superior technical specifications of the 68000, poignantly winning a small skirmish but losing the war. Intel dominates the general purpose microprocessor market to this day. The Intel versus Motorola story is definitively detailed in Bill Davidow’s now famous book, Marketing High Technology: An Insider’s View. Davidow’s book also includes numerous gems of insight into marketing. Bill’s thoughts on the barriers to a new entrant into an existing market have stuck with me over the years.

If the smartphone market is ever to revive, it needs to learn from Davidow’s lesson, ignore the specs, and concentrate on creating a higher level marketing message that meets deep customer needs.

 

Bill Davidow, former Intel Marketing Vice President

 

 

HBS Professor Ted Levitt’s Total Product Concept And Its Influence On Davidow

Though I have met with Bill Davidow many times, spent time with him, and invited him to speak with executives of an emerging technology company, I have never directly asked him about the degree to which Harvard Professor Ted Levitt’s concept of a Total Product influenced him. It does seem highly likely that it is the case.  By way of example, marketers often refer to “product differentiation.” Specsmanship is the lowest possible form of product differentiation. Creating a higher level of product value is the true essence of product differentiation. This is also the essence of Levitt’s now legendary Total Product. What is different in the Intel case is my memory of how Levitt’s Total Product model, was adapted at Intel. I will explain.

Harvard Business School Professor Ted Levitt

 

READ MORE: Levitt HBR: Marketing Success Through Differentiation of Anything

Levitt’s classic Total Product model is graphically displayed here:

In my personal view and recollection which I show here, I believe Davidow focused on the “Augmented Product,” “Expected Product” and the “Potential Product,” and avoided the “Generic Product” to win the specsmanship war with Motorola. I also distinctly remember a slightly different Intel model which is shown below.

The Intel Variation On The Ted Levitt Total Product Model

It is my recollection that we at Intel, and most likely Bill Davidow in particular, adapted the Ted Levitt model to Intel’s particular new market realities, and focused on the outer circle, “Corporate Vision” and “Product Roadmap” to win the microprocessor war. The “Engineering Deliverable” is not a product. It is only a naked engineering project deliverable. Specsmanship does not make it a product. The “Corporate Vision” and “Product Roadmap” offer greater long-term value to customers, and ultimately create a powerful brand image.

WCW III: World Chip War III

 Intel: The Missing Piece In The Epic New Global Microchip Battle

In the beginning, in the early 1970’s there were the original semiconductor companies like Intel, AMD, Motorola, and not far behind, the Japanese giants NEC, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi. The first great Chip War was in memory chips, primarily as replacements for magnetic core memory and for the emerging new minicomputer industry. The Japanese fought World Chip War One as a nation, using the power and influence of its entire government to compete against the American companies. At the behest of the U.S. government itself, IBM bought a minority share in Intel to potentially defend Intel against any hostile bid from the Japanese.  Not long afterward, the Great Microprocessor War, World Chip War Two exploded, primarily between Intel and Motorola. Intel was the victor of World Chip War Two, primarily due to the extraordinary marketing genius of Intel Marketing VP Bill Davidow’s “Crush” campaign, not superior Intel technology. It was a huge lesson of the importance of marketing over having the “coolest technology.”  Now after something of a long hiatus, we have World Chip War Three, which is being fought over “CODECS,” and related chips which power our smartphones. Today’s news about Broadcom’s bid for Qualcomm omits the other crucial player in this new War of Titans, Intel, which has risen from earlier ignominious failures to become the third player in WCW III.

Broadcom’s Bid For Qualcomm Marks Upheaval in Chip Industry

The California-based chip maker offered made an unsolicited $105 billion takeover bid for Qualcomm

Broadcom proposed to acquire rival chip maker Qualcomm for $70 per share. PHOTO: MIKE BLAKE/REUTERS

By

Ted Greenwald

Broadcom Ltd. AVGO 1.42% made an unsolicited $105 billion takeover bid for QualcommInc., QCOM 1.15% the chip industry’s boldest bet yet that size will equal strength at a time of technological upheaval.

The approach, which would mark the biggest technology takeover ever, shows how tech companies are positioning themselves for a world where a range of chip-driven devices—from phones to cars to factory robots—are transmitting, receiving and processing evermore information. Broadcom Chief Executive Hock Tan already has used acquisitions to build the company into the fourth-biggest chip maker by market value, part of a wave of industry consolidation as profits on some chips, such as those used in personal computers, are squeezed by sluggish sales and rising costs.

A combination with Qualcomm would create a behemoth whose chips manage communications among consumer devices and appliances, phone service providers, and data centers that are becoming the workhorses in artificial intelligence.

The deal is far from certain. San Diego-based Qualcomm, which said it would consider the proposal, is expected ultimately to rebuff it on the grounds that the price isn’t high enough, especially given the significant risk that regulators would block it, according to some analysts. Under typical circumstances, unfriendly bids like this are difficult to pull off; given the sheer size and complexity of Qualcomm, this one could be especially challenging, analysts said Monday.

Broadcom’s preference is to strike a friendly deal, but if it fails to do so, it would consider nominating Qualcomm directors who may be more amenable to a transaction, a person familiar with the matter said. The nomination deadline is Dec. 8 and the annual meeting at which the director vote would take place is likely be around March.

Broadcom offered $70 a share for Qualcomm, representing a 28% premium from its closing price on Thursday—before news reports on the expected approach.

Qualcomm shares ended trading Monday up 1.2% to $62.52, while Broadcom shares were 1.4% higher at $277.52.

Mr. Tan said he has been talking with Qualcomm for over a year about a possible tie-up. “Our strategy has been consistent,” Mr. Tan said in an interview. “When a business is No. 1 in technology and No. 1 in market position, we acquire it and put it on our Broadcom platform and grow through that strategy. Qualcomm has a very large sustainable franchise that meets those criteria.”

Should the deal be completed, Broadcom would take on Qualcomm’s leadership in developing the next wave of cellular technology, known as 5G, which is expected to roll out over the coming two years. That could give Broadcom a new growth engine, as 5G is expected to dramatically accelerate the speed and responsiveness of cellular communications necessary for applications like self-driving cars.

Broadcom was formed when Avago Technologies Ltd. bought the former Broadcom in 2015 for $39 billion and kept the name, and Mr. Tan has continued growing by acquisition. The company sells a diverse line of equipment for networking and communications. Its products include chips for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth technology that connect devices that are closer together—technologies that some analysts say are likely to grow less quickly than 5G.

“People will continue to use short-proximity wireless like Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, but the growth and money is clearly in 5G,” said analyst Patrick Moorhead of Moor Insights & Strategy.

Overall, Broadcom and Qualcomm have largely complementary product lines. But the possible Broadcom takeover is likely to face intense regulatory scrutiny, given the companies’ combined scale and the fact that they are both leaders in Wi-Fi and Bluetooth technology. The companies share customers including Apple Inc., whose iPhones and iPads include components from both Qualcomm and Broadcom.

Qualcomm already has been under pressure from antitrust agencies in several jurisdictions, including the U.S. The company has paid hefty regulatory fines in China, South Korea and Taiwan.

Qualcomm was riding high as recently as a year ago after unveiling the chip industry’s largest-ever acquisition: a $39 billion proposed deal for NXP Semiconductors NV. The deal hasn’t closed yet, and Broadcom said Monday that its proposal would stand regardless of whether Qualcomm’s proposed acquisition of NXP is consummated under the current terms.

Since then, a string of hits by regulators, competitors, and customers including Apple has left the industry titan in a vulnerable position. Qualcomm’s profit in the fiscal year that ended Sept. 24 plummeted 57%, and its share price declined 18% in the 12 months through Thursday’s close compared with a 58% rise in the PHLX Semiconductor Sector Index. That was before news of Broadcom’s interest sent Qualcomm shares up nearly 13% on Friday.

Funding for the deal would come in the form of loans from a gaggle of banks, with additional cash from Silver Lake Management LLC. The private-equity firm, which already owns a stake in Broadcom, provided a commitment letter for $5 billion in convertible debt. Silver Lake said a substantial portion of that capital would come in the form of an equity investment from its Silver Lake Partners fund, with the remainder from other sources.

The equity contribution would be the single largest in the history of the firm, exceeding the roughly $1 billion it invested in the merger of Dell Inc. and EMC Corp.

Broadcom’s bid came days after the Singapore-based company announced plans to relocate its headquarters to the U.S., a move that could make it easier to pursue acquisitions of U.S. targets.

Broadcom’s earlier $5.5 billion offer to buy Brocade Communication Systems, based in San Jose, Calif., has been delayed due to a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which reviews international deals that raise concerns about national security.

Any deal to acquire Qualcomm would also receive close scrutiny, experts say. “Anything that has the word semiconductor in it gets rapt attention from CFIUS,” said James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy think tank. “The move to the U.S. is an effort to tamp down CFIUS concerns.”

Partnerships, Collaboration and Co-opetition: More Important Than Ever

A Strategy For Survival in Tough Times

In the simplest terms, the concept here is how a company can potentially increase both revenue and market share by executing a strategy to work with its direct or indirect competitor(s) to the benefit of both, a win-win.  The old Arab saying, “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” also applies. It can also be as simple as joining an ad hoc collaboration among a group of companies or a standards group to create market order and simplicity from an overcrowded and confused market.  Customers invariably respond to products that provide the greatest value and paths to long-term increased value and cost reduction. Collaboration or “Co-opetition” is one of the most effective means to achieve that goal, particularly in an economic environment where “flat is the new up.”

Multibus: An Early Example of Collaboration Building A New Market

Soon after joining Intel, I learned about Intel’s concept of “Open Systems” and its “Multibus” system architecture.  Motorola was Intel’s primary competitor in microprocessors and so-called “single board computers” at that time.  Intel’s now legendary Marketing VP, Bill Davidow had developed a strategy to recruit other companies to support Multibus as an open system standard.  Davidow’s idea was to make Multibus more attractive to system designers by having a stable of compatible products from other companies supporting Multibus. It worked. Since that time the concept has evolved significantly and has played a major role in the development of many new markets. This post discusses some of the evolutionary changes, offers two high-tech case studies and some key requirements for successful collaboration.  It is more important now than ever as a survival strategy in a particularly challenging global economy.

The IBM Personal Computer Sets The Standard For The Future

Perhaps the best known high-tech example of an open system is the IBM Personal Computer, involving IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and thousands of other supporting companies. The result has been the creation of a huge new market, with over 400,000 applications for the PC, significant price competition, and interchangeable components from multiple vendors.  By contrast, Apple opted for a closed, proprietary system, which persists to this day, and continues to be a source of discontent from Apple customers: higher prices, as well as accessories and interfaces only available from Apple, etc. In sheer market share, the PC dominated at 85% of the total market, while Apple was forced to concentrate on niche markets like education and graphic design. I am not going to discuss the PC as it has been analyzed extensively over the years, though it does provide an excellent case study on the dynamics and market power of open systems versus closed proprietary systems.

 Important Current Co-opetition Successes: DSL And Android

I will discuss two other cases, one less well known and the other better known and more recent.  In the first case, I was personally involved so my experience enables me to speak in-depth on the topic.  Shortly after leaving Ascend Communications, I was called by a friend at Compaq/HP in Houston and asked to fly down to Houston for a private discussion with the VP of the Presario Division and his team.  The VP wanted to incorporate a high-speed digital subscriber line (DSL) connection in the Presario out of the box.  The idea was that a consumer would connect the PC to a standard RJ11 telephone wall jack, and be instantly connected to the Internet.  However, I had to explain that the challenges to this were enormous. First and foremost the telephone companies themselves could not agree on the standard for how DSL worked. Equally problematic, the DSL market was fragmented with dozens of competitors offering different proprietary solutions.

We decided to proceed regardless, recognizing that if HP/Compaq were to succeed with their ingenious idea, it would require a fundamental change in the current DSL market and the telcos.  This could only be attempted if Compaq joined forces with Intel and Microsoft, and even then the outcome would be uncertain.  I contacted Ali Sarabi in Intel’s Architecture Labs, who admitted that Intel had been thinking of the same idea, and talking with Microsoft as well. So within two weeks all three companies met at Microsoft in Bellevue and the idea gained steam. Soon after we held three days of secret meetings in Atlanta with DSL companies, without explaining our purpose, and came away completely dejected. Bringing the competitors together was hopeless. They all pointed in a different direction. It then dawned on us that if we could get the telecom companies to agree on a single DSL standard, they could unite and as “the customers,” and therefore dictate to the DSL competitors what they would buy. Nothing works better than the opportunity to make money.

Another round of secret meetings in Seattle with the telecoms, and follow-up meetings around the country led to a breakthrough: the formation of a global consortium of over 100 telecom companies and DSL companies that culminated in the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva Switzerland creating a single global DSL standard, which eventually made the original Compaq Presario vision a reality.

Special Interest Group Legal Framework Paves The Way

One of the keys to this success was a simple legal framework for the companies to collaborate, known now as a “Special Interest Group,” avoiding any hint of unfair competition and ensuring that the technical aspects of the standard would be in the public domain. The SIG legal document has since been used in a number of other developments, notably Bluetooth and USB.  Other standards bodies, like the IEEE and IETF, are also structured similarly, enabling the creation of crucial collaborative projects like WiFi. These efforts are now a key aspect of many high-tech markets. Many companies devote entire teams to managing their participation in these standards bodies and ad hoc industry collaboration activities. Even on a small scale, some agreed framework, a Memorandum of Understanding or a simple one-pager may be required to achieve the necessary trust to move forward.

Android Repeats The IBM PC Phenomenon

The second case of successful global industry-wide collaboration is the Google Android smartphone operating system versus Apple IOS.  Once again, Android is an open architecture while Apple IOS is a closed proprietary system. Android has been adopted by a wide range of smartphone manufacturers, most notably Samsung, HTC, and Huawei. Despite the well-publicised popularity of Apple’s iPhone, the fact remains that Android, as an open architecture dominates the global smartphone market at 82% market share in 2015, as reported by International Data Corporation (IDC), and Apple again stuck in the 15% range.

Global Smartphone Market Share 2015 (IDC)

Two Failures To Collaborate: Videoconferencing And The Internet of Things

The video conferencing market has been around for nearly thirty years. Originally, there were big bulky proprietary systems. Cisco Systems later became a major player with its own impressive HD technology. In all, there were nearly a dozen major competitors addressing an “enterprise market” for business use only. The equipment was very expensive. Then along came Skype, WebEx, Apple Facetime and others. The problem is that, after thirty years, none of these competitors applications can talk with any other application. Clearly, this is a problem. So “middleware” startups have sprung up, offering a simple translation of otherwise incompatible video transmission protocols. Bluejeans technology is one excellent example. I have used it personally in my UBC classes to link a guest lecture on Skype to UBC’s corporate video conferencing system because there is no other way to do it. Is this the best solution or cost-effective. Absolutely not. Why, after thirty years, has the video conferencing industry failed to standardize?

In another case, the emerging new market buzzword is “The Internet of Things.” This means that everything in your home can and will be connected to the Internet. Sounds simple enough, right?  Not exactly.  Today the IoT market remains a complex, confusing Tower of Babble, with multiple competing communications protocols. Some products support WiFi, but there is no one single agreed way to communicate. A recent ZDNet post explains that home automation currently requires that devices need to be able to connect with “multiple local- and wide-area connectivity options (ZigBee, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GSM/GPRS, RFID/NFC, GPS, Ethernet). Along with the ability to connect many different kinds of sensors, this allows devices to be configured for a range of vertical markets.” Huh?  This is the problem in a nutshell. You do not need to be a data communication engineer to get the point.   I have written here on this blog about this embarrassing failure to collaborate.

Summary

While the open architecture of the PC happened more or less organically, as so many companies were keen to get in on the action, the DSL problem was a hairball of enormous global complexity that had to be solved.  I am honored to have been part of that effort. Google’s decision to launch Android as an open architecture was more like Multibus, and the conscious strategic decision of Eric Schmidt and Larry Page to enter the market as an open system from the outset. Other examples in other industries abound and are documented in the now legendary book, Co-opetition.

The result in all three successful cases has been a dramatic market success. The key takeaway point is that in all three cases the open architecture created opportunity and expanded the market.  Industry collaborations like this are as relevant for smaller markets with only two or three competitors as for large complex markets.  Collaboration can be the key to company survival or failure.